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STATE OF MAINE v. NORTON:




In Maine v. Norton,' Maine and several Maine business associations
filed suit challenging the decision made by the Department of the Interior
to list the distinct population segment (DPS) of Gulf of Maine Atlantic
salmon as endangered.2 Upon cross-motions for summary judgment, the
court established that the listing decision was based upon the best scientific
data available and clearly supported by the administrative record? The
court granted defendant's motion and, accordingly, the listing decision was
upheld.'
This case presented to the federal court the decision whether to dismiss
the Plaintiffs' motions for lack of standing5 or, alternatively, to determine
whether listing the DPS of Gulf of Maine Atlantic salmon was accurate and
lawful under the Endangered Species Act.6 Although the Maine court
chose to dismiss the Maine business associations' motion, the court took
judicial notice of the facts necessary to establish standing by the State of
Maine, noting the importance of the issues to be determined in this case.7
This application of rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence enabled the
court to make a detailed determination of the issues raised by this listing
* University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2005.
1. 257 F. Supp. 2d 357 (D. Me. 2003).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 407.
4. Id
5. Id. at 372.
6. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 376.
7. Id. at 373. The court states, "It]he importance of the issues raised in this case
persuades the Court to apply the doctrine of judicial notice to determine whether the State
of Maine has standing to challenge the listing decision." Id
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decision. The question now becomes: was this an appropriate application
of judicial notice under Federal Rule 201?
This Note reviews the purpose of the Endangered Species Act of 1973,
and the roles that both the State and federal agencies have played through-
out the process of listing the DPS of Gulf of Maine Atlantic salmon. The
Note considers the elements required to take judicial notice under the
Federal Rules of Evidence, and the court's authority to utilize this
adjudicative procedure. Further, this Note weighs the Maine court's
application of Rule 201 to this case, and concludes that the decision to take
judicial notice in order to establish standing by Plaintiff, the State of
Maine, was judicious and well-timed, considering the current economic
climate of the State and the continued threats to the survival of the wild
Maine salmon population.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Endangered Species Act of 1973
The Endangered Species Act (ESA)' was enacted by Congress in 1973
as a response to the rapidly increasing number of fish, plant, and wildlife
species that had been rendered extinct, or were threatened by extinction,
due to "economic growth and development untempered by adequate
concern or conservation."9 Congress has stated that the purpose of this Act
is to provide a means to conserve the ecosystems upon which threatened
and endangered species depend, and to provide a program for the conserva-
tion of those species.' ° The Supreme Court has explained, "[tihe plain
intent of Congress in enacting th[e] statute was to halt and reverse the trend
towards species extinction, whatever the cost.""
The authority to list a species as threatened or endangered is vested
with the Secretary of the Interior, 2 and a listing may be initiated by either
the Secretary or by petition from any interested party. 3 The ESA requires
that the listing decision be made on the basis of the best scientific and
commercial data available. 4 Further, when making a decision the
8. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1988).
9. i § 1531.
10. Id. § 1531(b).
11. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 362 (quoting Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S.
153, 184(1978)).
12. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(2). The Secretary of Commerce is also authorized to list
marine mammals. Id.
13. Id. §§ 1533(b)(1)(A)-(b)(3)(A).
14. Id. § 1533(b)(1)(A).
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Secretary is required to conduct a status review, and must take into account
efforts being made by a state to protect the species within its area of
jurisdiction. 5
While merely listing a species under the ESA cannot ensure the
survival of the species, the listing decision does carry a "potent array of
protections." 6 The most notable of those protections is the Act's prohibi-
tion on the "taking" of a listed species, which renders unlawful the
harming, wounding, killing, collecting, pursuing or capturing of any listed
species.' 7 The Act additionally mandates that all federal agencies seek to
conserve those species that are listed as endangered.' 8
Given the Act's strength and widespread consequences, the decision to
list a species under the ESA can be very controversial. 9 When a final
listing decision is challenged, the agency's action is subject to judicial
review under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).' Under the APA,
the agency's decision can be reversed, inter alia, if it is "arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with
law."
2 1
B. History of the Listing Decision
Despite efforts made during the past 130 years by both state and federal
agencies, the numbers of wild Atlantic salmon in the United States have
been declining at a staggering rate.22 Historically, Atlantic salmon
populations were native to almost "every major coastal river north of the
Hudson," including more than twenty-eight Maine rivers.' In the early
1990s the first federal action was taken by the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service (the Services)
to determine the status of the Atlantic salmon population; the Services
stated that the only remaining native populations were to be found in seven
15. Id.
16. Tony A. Sullins, Endangered Species Act-Judicial Review of an Emergency
Listing-A Wasteful Allocation of Resources? City of Las Vegas v. Lujan, 891 F.2d 927
(D.C. Cir. 1989), 26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 619, 622 (1991).
17. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1538(a)(1)(B), 1532(19) (1988).
18. Id. § 1536(a)(2).
19. See MICHAELJ. BEAN, THE EVOLUTION OFNATIONAL WLDLIFE LAW 334 (rev. ed.
1983).
20. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706(1994). The Act provides the moving party a right tojudicial
review of "final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in a court." I&
§ 704.
21. Id. § 706.
22. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 364.
23. Id.
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Maine rivers.u Upon receiving petitions to list the Atlantic salmon under
the ESA, the Services conducted a status review in 1995,' and proposed to
list as endangered the "distinct population segment" of Gulf of Maine
Atlantic salmon.'
Concurrent to this listing proposal, the Services invited the State of
Maine to develop a conservation plan that would decrease the risks to this
threatened population.27 The Services asserted that such a plan would
allow the State "to maintain the lead role in the management of activities
that could impact Atlantic salmon in the DPS."'  The Services further
recommended that this plan address threats posed to the population by
activities such as recreational fishing, habitat modification, and aqua-
culture. 29
Governor Angus King accepted this invitation and convened a task
force that developed the "Atlantic Salmon Conservation Plan for Seven
Maine Rivers," which was submitted to the Services in the spring of 1997. 3°
The State set forth a detailed plan of action that included ongoing and
proposed measures to decrease potential threats to the salmon and
rehabilitate their habitat.31 The plan included a five-year implementation
schedule that assessed actual and potential threats to Atlantic salmon in
Maine waters, and set benchmarks for state and federal agencies and
private stakeholders.32
Upon reconsideration of its listing proposal, the Services took into
account the significant and ongoing efforts made by the State to protect this
distinct population of salmon under the Maine Conservation Plan.33 The
Services concluded that threats to the DPS of Atlantic salmon in Maine had
been reduced, and the population was "not likely to become endangered in
24. Id. at 365. The remaining native salmon populations were found in the Dennys,
Machias, East Machias, Narraguagus, Pleasant, Ducktrap, and Sheepscot Rivers in downeast
Maine. Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and Plants, 59 Fed. Reg. 3067 (Jan. 20, 1994).
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (1988).
26. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 366. The Services cited as threats to the population: 1)
low natural survival rate; 2) poaching; and 3) impacts from aquaculture and fish hatcheries.
Id.
27. Id.
28. Id. See also Endangered and Threatened Species, 60 Fed. Reg. 50,535 (Sept. 29,
1995).
29. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 366-67.
30. Id. at 367; Atlantic Salmon Conservation Plan for Seven Maine Rivers, available
at http://www.state.me.us/asa/99AnnRpt.html (last visited Sept. 25, 2003).
31. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
32. Id.
33. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(1)(A) (1988).
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the foreseeable future."' The proposal to list was consequently withdrawn
in December, 1997.35
In 1999, the Defenders of Wildlife, along with several private
individuals and environmental organizations, filed a lawsuit against the
Secretary of the Interior (the Defenders of Wildlife lawsuit) challenging the
decision to withdraw the proposed listing of the DPS of Gulf of Maine
Atlantic salmon under the ESA.36 The Defenders of Wildlife lawsuit
alleged that the Services improperly considered future and voluntary
measures proposed by the Maine Conservation Plan when making their
determination,37 and requested both an emergency and permanent listing of
this salmon population.3 Nine months after this lawsuit commenced - and
less than two years after their determination that the population was "not
likely to become endangered" - the Services found that the DPS of Atlantic
salmon was now "in danger of extinction" and re-initiated the proposal to
list.39 Although the State of Maine strongly disagreed with the listing and
challenged the policies used in making the determination,4' the Services
nevertheless published their final rule in November of 2000, determining
that the DPS of Gulf of Maine Atlantic salmon was in danger of extinction
throughout its range.4'
C. Judicial Notice
In Maine v. Norton, the court took judicial notice of the fact that the
State's sovereign interests were directly impacted by the Services' decision
34. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 367. See also Endangered and Threatened Wildlife and
Plants, 62 Fed. Reg. 66,337 (Dec. 18, 1997).
35. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 367.
36. 1& at 399.
37. 1I In Oregon Natural Resources v. Daley, the court stated that the Services may
only consider "conservation efforts that are currently operational, not those promised to be
implemented in the future" when deciding whether to list a species as endangered. 6 F.
Supp. 2d 1139, 1154 (D. Or. 1998). Further, this court held that the Services could not
consider voluntary or "unenforcable efforts" because those actions are merely speculative.
I at 1155.
38. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 399.
39. Id. at 399-400. See also Availability of a Status Review of the Atlantic Salmon in
the Gulf of Maine Distinct Population Segment, 64 Fed. Reg. 56,297-56,298 (Oct. 19,
1999).
40. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 400 n.21.
41. Endangered or Threatened Species, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,459 (Nov. 17, 2000). The
Services' concluded that listing was appropriate due to the danger of extinction to the
Atlantic salmon population created by disease, inadequate regulation of agricultural water
withdrawals, impacts from aquaculture practices, and low marine survival. Id. at 69,479.
2003]
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to list the DPS of Gulf of Maine Atlantic salmon under the ESA.42 The
court noted that the application ofjudicial notice was appropriate, as "[t]he
State of Maine and its sovereign interests involved in the listing is not a
matter of dispute."43
Judicial notice is an adjudicative device that dispenses with formal
proof and provides a flexible procedure for the court to establish that
particular information is true.' "Judicial notice is based on the assumption
that certain information does not need to be proved by the introduction of
evidence at trial."" Judicially noticed facts must possess the requisite
degree of certainty and may not be subject to reasonable dispute.' The
principle of judicial notice will only apply to cases where certain prerequi-
sites have been met: first, the matter must be common knowledge, although
it does not have to be universally known; second, the matter must be settled
beyond a doubt with no uncertainties; and third, the knowledge must exist
within the jurisdiction of the court.47
One of the basic objectives of Rule 201 is the promotion of judicial
convenience and economy.4" When a matter is not reasonably disputable,
establishing adjudicative facts through judicial notice can save the court
time, energy, and money by dispensing with formal proof.49 In either a
bench or jury trial, the court has the authority to take judicial notice of an
adjudicative fact at any stage of the proceeding.' The court may do so at
its discretion, whether or not requested by a party to the suit.5 '
Traditionally, courts have taken a cautious approach to judicially
noticing adjudicative facts. 2 Within the bounds of the Rule 201,
42. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 374.
43. Id.
44. 29 AM. JUR. 2D Evidence § 24 (2003).
45. Id See, e.g., Cupey Bajo Nursing Home, Inc. v. U.S., 36 Fed. Cl. 122, 135 n.22
(1996) ("By taking judicial notice of a fact, the court may inform itself of a particular fact
without resort to evidentiary proof."); Meredith v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 18 F.3d 890, 895(10th Cir. 1994) (judicial notice "is when ajudge recognizes the truth of certain facts, which
from their nature are not properly the subject of testimony, or which are universally regarded
as established by common knowledge.").
46. FED. R. EviD. 201(b).
47. 29 AM. JuR. 2d Evidence § 24.
48. 1-201 WEINsIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE: NATURE OF JUDICIAL NOTICE,§ 201.02
at 2 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 2003).
49. Id. (citing Comment, The Presently Expanding Concept ofJudicial Notice, 13 ViL.
L. REV. 528, 541-46 (1968)).
50. FED. R. EVID. 201(0.
51. Id. at 201(c).
52. 1-201 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERALEVIDENCE: JUDICIALNOTICEOFADJUDICATIvEFACrS,
§ 201.10 at 1 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc., 2003).
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adjudicative facts that are established through judicial notice are typically
those that are well known and easily recalled by the general population. 3
For example, courts have taken judicial notice of the "traditional features
of a snowman;" the popularity of certain reusable containers; or the
impossibility of driving from one place to another in a specific period of
* 54time.
Appellate courts, when reviewing the use of Rule 201 by the trial
courts, have maintained this cautious approach, and frequently find error
in judicially noticed facts that are beyond reasonable controversy. For
example, the appellate court found in Lussier v. Runyon that the trial court
erred in taking judicial notice of disability benefits that the plaintiff
expected to receive through the Civil Service Retirement System, since the
information was not readily determined by general knowledge nor by the
public record, and the monetary amount remained a disputed fact.5 5 In
Lozano v. Ashcroft, the trial court was found to have erred by taking
judicial notice that the Department of Justice received Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) discrimination findings on a specified
date, as the date of actual receipt remained in genuine dispute throughout
the trial.' Similarly, in U.S. v. Jones, the trial court was held in error by
judicially noticing a "fact" that had been found by the court in a related
proceeding, because the fact was not indisputable under Rule 201 and was
actually disputed by the party throughout the proceeding.5"
Courts have been urged to apply Rule 201 stringently, especially in
cases where the adjudicative fact in question is at all subject to reasonable
dispute.58 This approach is warranted because a court should not "bypass"
the adversarial, truth-finding process of our judicial system in the interest
of judicial convenience and economy.59
53. Lussierv. Runyon, 50F.3d 1103, 1114(lstCir. 1995).
54. Id. (citing Eden Toys, Inc. v. Marshall Field & Co., 675 F.2d 498,500 n. 1 (2d Cir.
1982); Price Food Co. v. Good Foods, Inc., 400 F.2d 662, 665 (6th Cir. 1968); and U.S. v.
Baborian, 528 F. Supp. 324,332 (D.R.I. 1981)).
55. Runyon, 50 F.3d at 1114.
56. Lozano v. Ashcroft, 258 F.3d 1160, 1164-65 (10th Cir. 2001).
57. U. S. v. Jones, 29 F.3d 1549, 1553 (11 th Cir. 1994).
58. Runyon, 50 F.3d at 1114.
59. Idt
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III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In Maine v. Norton,'° Maine and several Maine business associations61
brought an action against the Secretary of the Interior62 following the
November, 2000, determination by the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service to list the Gulf of Maine
distinct population segment of Atlantic salmon as endangered under the
ESA.63 Upon cross motions for summary judgment," the court granted
Defendant's motion concluding that the Services did not act in a manner
that was unlawful nor contrary to the APA when listing the Gulf of Maine
Atlantic salmon as endangered.' The court reasoned that the Services'
decision to list the salmon as endangered was supported by the administra-
tive record and was necessary considering the continued threats to this
distinct population.
Plaintiffs challenge the listing decision under the APA,6 alleging that
the listing decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, and/or
otherwise not in accordance with the law. 7 Plaintiff, the State of Maine,
contends that the decision to list was motivated by litigation concerns
rather than conditions that had changed with respect to the DPS of Atlantic
salmon." Further, the State argues that the Services' listing decision
should be set aside because it is premised on an unlawful interpretation of
60. 257 F. Supp. 2d 357 (D. Me. 2003).
61. Maine Chamber of Commerce, Atlantic Salmon of Maine, LLC., Stolt Sea Farm,
Inc., Maine Aquaculture Association, Maine Pulp and Paper Association, Wild Blueberry
Commission of Maine, Jasper Wyman & Sons, Cherryfield Foods, Inc. (Maine Businesses).
Id. at 361.
62. Gale A. Norton, in her Official Capacity as Secretary of the United States
Department of the Interior, et. al. Id. at 357.
63. Endangered and Threatened Species, 65 Fed. Reg. 69,459 (Nov. 17, 2000).
64. The court determined that summary judgment is the appropriate procedure for
resolving the issues in this case, as their review is based upon the administrative record. As
a general rule, in cases brought pursuant to the APA all relevant facts are contained in the
administrative record and, as a result, there are no material facts in dispute. Maine, 257 F.
Supp. 2d at 363.
65. Id. at 397.
66. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-707 (1966).
67. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 361. In their complaint, Plaintiffs, the Maine
Businesses, also raised claims alleging that the decision to list Gulf of Maine Atlantic sal-
mon DPS under the Endangered Species Act is both procedurally and factually illegal, and
is an unconstitutional violation of both due process and the Commerce Clause. Id at
361-62.
68. Id. at 398. Specifically, the State is referring to the 1999 Defenders of Wildlife
lawsuit. See note 36.
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the term "distinct population segment," and expands the definition of
"species" beyond that which was intended by Congress.69
The Plaintiff, State of Maine, contends that it has both constitutional
and prudential standing" to challenge the action because the listing
decision interferes with two of the State's sovereign interests: one, the
State's ability to manage its own natural resources and two, the State's
ability to enact and enforce its own laws.71 The State asserts that listing
this salmon population injures their sovereign interests because it essen-
tially nullifies any State law or regulation that would be considered an
illegal "take" under the ESA, such as the State's regulation of recreational
and commercial Atlantic salmon fishing, aquaculture operations, and water
use management.72 These injuries, the State argues, are directly and solely
caused by the decision to list the Gulf of Maine Atlantic salmon under the
ESA, and a judgment vacating the listing would redress those injuries."3
Defendants contend that the decision to list the Gulf of Maine Atlantic
salmon under the Endangered Species Act was based solely on the best
scientific and commercial data available, as supported by the administrative
record.74 Defendants maintain that the standard the Services used in
making their determination was not only in accordance with the law, but
also reflected Congress's intent that the agency take conservation measures
before a species is "'conclusively' headed for extinction." '75 The Services
69. Id. at 406. Although Congress has not defined the term "distinct population
segment," the State argues specifically that the Services' interpretation of "distinct pop-
ulation segment" is based solely upon international boundaries and other geographical
considerations, which is beyond the interpretation that Congress intended. Plaintiffs
Motion for Summary Judgment at 13-24; Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 383 (citing Policy
Regarding the Recognition of Distinct Vertebrae Population Segments Under the
Endangered Species Act, 61 Fed. Reg. 4722 (Feb. 7, 1996).
70. As required by both U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 and 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966).
71. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 373.
72. Id. at 374. The State's assertion is true both by virtue of the U.S. CONST. art. VI,
cl. 2 (invalidating state laws that interfere with, or are contrary to, federal law) and by the
ESA's own preemption provision, 16 U.S.C. § 1535(0. Id.
73. Id. at 373.
74. Id. at 375.
75. Id. Further, the Services found that of the five factors set forth by section 4 of the
ESA in determining whether to list a species as endangered under 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1),
the Gulf of Maine Atlantic salmon population were implicated for each one of the factors.
Id. at 397. These factors include:
(A) the present or threatened destruction, modification, or curtailment of its habitat
or range;
(B) overutilization for commercial, recreational, scientific, or educational purposes;
(C) disease or predation;
(D) the inadequacy of existing regulatory mechanisms; or
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explained that in several critical areas, such as water use management,
disease, and aquaculture operations, "[e]xisting regulatory mechanisms
either lack the capacity or have not been implemented to decrease or
remove threats to wild Atlantic salmon.,
76
Defendants argued that the Plaintiffs' complaints should be dismissed
for lack of standing, because they failed to make the necessary evidentiary
showing of specific facts that they were among the injured, as required by
Local Rule 56.' Defendants further argued that the Plaintiff, State of
Maine, brought a citizen suit under section 4 of the ESA, and not under the
APA, and that Plaintiffs' claims should therefore be dismissed because the
State failed to submit the statutorily imposed sixty-day notice of intent to
sue.
78
Plaintiffs, the Maine Businesses attached supporting affidavits from
each representative in order to establish the facts necessary to satisfy their
standing requirements. 79 However, these Plaintiffs failed to present the
facts either in the Supporting Statement of Material Facts or the Opposing
Statement of Material Facts, as required by Local Rule 56." Consequently,
the Maine court ruled that the affidavits could not be considered, and held
that the Plaintiff, Maine Businesses', claims "must be dismissed" because
they failed to meet their burden of establishing standing to challenge the
listing of the Gulf of Maine Atlantic salmon as endangered."'
Although the State of Maine also failed to satisfy the requirements of
Local Rule 56, the court stated that it would take judicial notice of the
State's sovereign interests involved in the listing decision, as those facts
were not in dispute. 2 The court held that the injuries to the State's
(E) other natural or manmade factors affecting its continued existence.
Id. (citing 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(1)). In order to list a species under the ESA, the Services
only need to find that one of these factors is satisfied. d
76. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 397 (quoting 65 Fed. Reg. 69,459, 69,477 (Nov. 17,
2000)). Specifically, the Services found that the aquaculture industry poses a serious threat
to survival of the population because escaping fish compete for habitat, spread disease, and
interbreed with the wild salmon population. Id. (citing 65 Fed. Reg. 69,459,69,478 (Nov.
17, 2000)).
77. Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment at 10-11. Maine, 257 F. Supp.
2d at 371-72. The facts necessary to establish the parties' standing to bring the suit, which
are not included in the administrative record of the case, must satisfy the requirements of
Local Rule 56. Id. at 372; D. ME. LOcALR. 56.
78. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 376; see 16 U.S.C. § 1540 (g)(2)(C) (1973) (requiring
written notice must be given to the Secretary sixty days prior to commencement of any
action).
79. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 371.
80. Id. at372; D. ME. LoCALR. 56(h).
81. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 372.
82. 1l at 373.
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sovereign interests therefore satisfied the elements of both constitutional
and prudential standing to bring the suit. 3 Moreover, the court concluded
that the State's claim challenging the final listing decision was subject to
judicial review under the APA, not the ESA, and therefore the State was
not required to file a sixty-day written notice."
After lengthy consideration, the court found that the Services'
interpretation of the term "distinct population segment" as applied to the
Gulf of Maine Atlantic salmon, and the Services' application of the 1996
Joint DPS Policy, were reasonable in light of ambiguous statutory
language. 5 The court, noting that it must defer to an agency's scientific
and technical expertise," held that the Services' findings were based on the
best scientific and commercial evidence, and were clearly supported by the
administrative record. 7 The State's argument that the listing was
improperly motivated by litigation concerns failed to convince the court
that the Services considered anything other than the best evidence available
to them while making their listing decision.8
IV. ASSESSING THE ROLE OF JUDICIAL NOTICE
Since the inception of the Endangered Species Act in 1973, battles
between conservation groups and industry have become commonplace.
Economic factors drive these battles in that the livelihood of the local
population often depends upon those industries whose practices threaten
the species that are listed under the ESA. Listing a species as "endangered"
or "threatened" under this Act affects more than the fish, wildlife, or plants
protected; the listing affects the industries that are further regulated by yet
another federal administrative agency, the employees of those industries
whose jobs are threatened, and the economy of the state that is dependent
upon those industries and an employed workforce.
83. Id at 374-75. The court acknowledged that the listing injures the State by
interfering with its sovereign interests; that the injury is "obviously causally connected" to
the listing decision; and that the injury would be redressed by a favorable decision vacating
the listing decision. Id. Further, the court stated that the State's alleged injuries fell within
the "zone of interests" encompassed by the Endangered Species Act, as required by section
702 of the APA, and therefore fulfilled the prudential standing requirement. Id. at 375.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 386-87.
86. Maine, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 389 (citing ALLTEL Corp. v. FCC, 838 F.2d 551,
561-62 (D.C. Cir. 1988), the court explained that they must defer to an agency's expertise
as long as the agency's decisions are reasonable).
87. Id. at 390-91.
88. Id. at 398, 400.
20031
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Against this backdrop comes Maine v. Norton. This case demonstrates
the classic battle between an economically challenged, rural state and a
well-funded conservation group that has pressured the Secretary of the
Interior to list the Atlantic salmon as an endangered species. The State of
Maine has never before been in a position where the listing of an endan-
gered species has had such a palpable effect upon the economy of the state
and its citizens.
The determination that the wild Atlantic salmon that inhabit the Gulf
of Maine are a "distinct population segment" and may therefore be
protected under the Endangered Species Act, has a direct impact upon
hundreds of Maine businesses, both large and small. Due to the Act's
prohibition on the "taking" of a listed species, the State will no longer be
in complete control of regulating many of the activities within its own
waterways. The effect of listing the salmon population as endangered
handcuffs the State when making immediate regulatory decisions that
impact not only the wildlife and natural resources within its jurisdiction,
but also the industries that generate much-needed revenue. For example,
the State will be unable to determine the extent to which persons may fish
for Atlantic salmon within its jurisdiction, which affects tourism, and
recreational and commercial fishing. Dredging, bulldozing, displacing soil,
and discharging pollutants into the waterways will also no longer be within
the State's direct control, which could seriously impact the agriculture,
forestry, and aquaculture industries within the State.
The State has an undeniable interest in protecting the interests of those
industries within its borders. Revenue from the agriculture, fishing,
forestry, aquaculture, and tourism industries enrich the economic climate
of the State and its people, and enable the economy to recover in times of
need. Clearly, Maine had a strong economic interest in de-listing this DPS
of Atlantic salmon, as federal regulations on water use management,
commercial and recreational fishing, and environmental policies will trump
any state regulations and legal codes currently in force.
The Maine court understood the impact of this listing decision upon the
State and its economy. The court realized that the importance of the issues
in this case warranted decisive action regarding the Services' listing
decision of the DPS of Gulf of Maine Atlantic salmon as endangered.
However, in order to rule on the motions for summary judgment, the court
first had to establish that the State of Maine had standing in the case.
In Maine, the court conceded that, like the Maine Business associa-
tions, the State had failed to provide the evidentiary support necessary to
establish standing under Local Rule 56. The State needed to establish that
its sovereign interests were sufficiently injured by the listing decision under
the ESA. Citing Lussier v. Runyon, the court determined that the State's
State of Maine v. Norton
sovereign interests in the listing were not a matter of dispute, and took
judicial notice of those facts. The Maine court must also have reasoned
that those adjudicative facts were capable of ready and accurate determina-
tion, and beyond reasonable controversy, as required by Federal Rule 201.
Although this was not a cautionary approach to applying the doctrine of
judicial notice, it was an effective one.
By applying judicial notice, the court was able to establish the State's
constitutional and prudential standing in the case without resort to
evidentiary proof. This decision enabled the court to rule on the cross-
motions for summary judgment. If judicial notice under Rule 201 had not
been applied, the State's motion would have been dismissed for lack of
standing, as were the Maine Business associations'. Thus the challenge to
the final listing decision of the DPS of Gulf of Maine Atlantic salmon
would have remained unresolved.
Ultimately, the long-range goals of the parties in this case may be the
same: the protection of the population of Atlantic salmon distinct to the
Gulf of Maine. The State of Maine has a long history of working with the
federal government to protect the Atlantic salmon and its habitat. Their
commitment to protection has been demonstrated through the allocation of
time and financial resources.8 9 However, recent budget shortfalls within
the State may have made sustainable efforts to protect the salmon
population and its habitat impracticable. Further, the State's Atlantic
Salmon Conservation Plan may have proven economically unfeasible to
maintain at the levels necessary to ensure the long-term survival of the
population.
In light of these and other important issues raised by the Services'
listing decision, the Maine court's application of judicial notice under
Federal Rule 201 was indeed judicious. The time was ripe to ensure that
this salmon population did not become further threatened or endangered.
The court's ruling ensures that the Department of the Interior, and the State
of Maine, will take actions to preserve this distinct population segment of
Gulf of Maine Atlantic salmon before extinction.
89. See Me. Atlantic Salmon Comm'n, Atlantic Salmon Conservation Plan for Seven
Maine Rivers, 1999 Annual Progress Report, available at http://www.state.me.ustasa/99
AnnRpt.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2003).
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